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Abstract 
This paper assesses whether domestic costs of reserve accumulation –and in particular 
monetary costs– constitute an eventual limit to the process in emerging markets. We find 
that sterilization is the first measure to deal with these costs. Then, we turn to study whether 
diminishing ability to deal with the monetary inflows through sterilization is an effective limit to 
the process, Indeed, when the scope for sterilization is reduced, accumulation diminishes. 
However, this constraint, albeit relevant in practice, has not constituted an effective limit to 
accumulation, hitherto. 
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1 Introduction 
Globalization has fostered a large increase in the financial flows among countries in the last 
fifteen years. Although the increase in flows has been particularly acute among developed 
countries, developing countries and in particular emerging market economies have also 
experienced an important increase in the magnitude of flows, which are characterised by their 
volatility. In parallel with these developments, as shown in graphs 1 and 2, the level of 
accumulated reserves, in particular in emerging countries has registered unprecedented 
growth since 1997, leading the global stock of foreign exchange reserves to unknown 
magnitudes and to a marked concentration. 
This process of reserve accumulation has arguably had an important impact on the 
global economy, in particular, through its perceived contribution to global imbalances. The 
demand of dollar treasuries would have helped to maintain long run interest rates relatively 
low for the current cyclical expansion and prevented the dollar from adjusting. Both elements 
would have facilitated the persistence of a situation of twin deficits– current account and fiscal 
balances– in the US. Since the countries which accumulate reserves do not seem to 
internalize the costs they impose on global financial stability and multilateral negotiations for a 
coordinated adjustment progress slowly, the sustainability of the process –and of global 
imbalances– basically rests on the perceived balance of costs and benefits by the reserve 
accumulating countries. 
In a first stage, the main driver for reserve accumulation in most emerging countries 
was to replenish the stock of reserves in the aftermath of severe financial crises in order to 
reduce financial vulnerabilities for the future. Nowadays, however, the magnitudes largely 
surpass in many cases this precautionary aim, so that the persistence of the process is seen 
as driven generally by the objective of managing the exchange rates at a certain desired level 
or range. 
However, it is well known that reserve accumulation entails also some domestic 
costs –monetary, financial, fiscal,…– but they have remained absent in much of the recent 
discussions on the issue, although they are becoming an increasing concern in some 
countries. Moreover, the empirical analyses have focused on the drivers of reserve 
accumulation, but not on its limits. Given these considerations, the goal of this paper is to 
explore to what extent economic costs are or may become an effective determinant –and 
eventually a constraint– of reserve accumulation in the context of increasing global flows. 
This is done both through an empirical analysis, whose results are not conclusive, and 
through the examination of several country cases which highlight the costs of the process. 
We hope the results may shed some light on the eventual limits on the reserve accumulation 
process currently underway. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses recent empirical 
work on the drivers of reserve accumulation; section 3 discusses the main costs of reserve 
accumulation; section 4 presents three case studies –China, Russia and Argentina–, section 
5, tests empirically the main hypothesis –that the costs of reserve accumulation, together 
to the benefits of reserve accumulation, explains the current process of reserve accumulation; 
the final section presents the main conclusions. 
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RESERVE ACCUMULATION. LEVELS BY REGION GRAPH 1
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics)
(*) Until second quarter
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (*)
Eastern Europe Latin America
CIS (includes Russia) Middle East
China Rest of Emerging Asia
Rest of world Serie8
  USD bn
 
RESERVE ACCUMULATION.
RATES OF GROWTH AND REGIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS GRAPH 2
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
(*) 2Q 2006 relative to 2Q 2005.
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2 Drivers of reserve accumulation. Recent empirical evidence 
From a financial accounting point of view, the process of reserve accumulation is given –in a 
number of countries– by the co-existence of large current account surplus and private 
financial inflows. More precisely, the following equality approximately holds 
Reserve accumulation = Net private financial inflows + Current account balance +  
+Capital Account + Errors and omissions 
As shown in the graph 3 all emerging regions –but Eastern Europe– display a 
remarkable current account surplus and some of them also large net private financial inflows. 
CURRENT ACCOUNT, CAPITAL FLOWS AND RESERVES GRAPH 3
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics and 
World Economic Outlook [June 2006]).
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Beyond accounting, this evidence uncovers the two main drivers for reserve 
accumulation: the desire to keep the exchange rate around a desired level and the desire to 
self-protect against sudden stops of financial flows, and to attain a healthier country balance 
sheet. Implicitly, reserves are accumulated in order to counteract appreciation pressures, 
which are driven by capital inflows and, as a consequence, the current account surpluses are 
prevented from adjusting. Note that this surplus external position also entails a reduction in 
vulnerability since the country as a whole is a net exporter of capital, not being reliant on the 
foreign capital. This suggests that the drivers of accumulation are rooted in such identity. 
A number of recent papers, which in general focus on the precautionary motive, 
have re-estimated reserve demand equations. The econometric evidence (Edison, 2003; 
Gosselin and Parent, 2005) suggests that traditional determinants of the demand of 
international reserves –imports and short term to GDP, etc,– fail to explain the very large 
volume and distribution of reserve accumulation. The graph 4 shows that the months of 
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imports covered by reserves is much higher than the precautionary level (four, according to 
the literature), while in graph 5, it is observed that the ratio of short-term external debt by 
2004 was larger than 1 in all the cases, the threshold suggested by the Guidotti-Greenspan 
rule as enough to counteract liquidity needs in case of financial turmoil. 
RESERVES OVER IMPORTS GRAPH 4
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
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One problem with this sort of evidence is that the optimal level of reserves is made 
contingent on the current economic situation. Since the precautionary motive aims at insuring 
against prospective crises, it is more interesting to conjecture whether the current level of 
reserves would be enough to effectively face a crises. However, when these considerations 
have been taken into account (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006)– the finding is still that the level of 
reserves is beyond the optimal in many countries. In particular, according to their findings, 
international reserves would be adequate in Latin America, and excessive in Asia. The main 
shortcoming of these results is that they assess reserve adequacy until 2003, and since then 
the vulnerability has been further reduced, the fundamentals have improved and in spite of it 
reserves have go on increasing. 
Some authors (Aizenman and Marion, 2002a, 2002b; Aizenman and Lee, 2005; 
García and Soto, 2004; Kim et al, 2004) have explained this failure (and also the differences in 
the patterns of reserve accumulation among emerging countries) by suggesting that the 
emphasis is now higher on precautionary motives. Furthermore, it is also argued that 
increasing financial globalisation and the higher magnitude and volatility of capital flows that it 
entails, probably call for  a higher  scale of accumulation, regardless of the underlying 
motives, On the one hand, the quantity of reserves to manage the  exchange rates is 
increasing in the magnitude and volatility of capital flows; on the other hand,  the potential 
reversal of flows within a financial crises is also larger, requiring also a higher level of reserves 
to guarantee effectiveness. Redrado et al. (2006) point out that the huge reserve 
accumulation of countries in an intermediate level of development, in a context of global 
financial integration, can be explained by self-protection motives due to the inexistence of a 
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lender of last resort, and find that inertia and regional imitation are other relevant drivers of the 
process. 
RESERVES OVER SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT GRAPH 5
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
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All in all, the magnitude and persistence of the current process suggest that the 
exchange rate management motives may be increasingly relevant. This is most clear in Asia, 
but it also applies to other countries, like some Latin American countries and oil producers, 
where the desire to limit exchange rate appreciations is evident.  The stability of exchange 
rates in countries with high reserve accumulation can be observed in graph 6, where are 
displayed the variation in international reserves and exchange rates for the countries in our 
sample within the period 2004-2005.  
A quite suggestive theory explaining the process in Asia, and mainly, the perspective 
that it will continue for a long time has been advocated by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber (2005). They state that the process of reserve accumulation by Asian countries is a 
consequence of an export-led growth strategy that, by maintaining the exchange rate 
depreciated with respect to the rate that would emerge had the central bank not act in the 
markets, generates current account and financial account surpluses, thanks to trade balance 
surplus and expectations of appreciation of the exchange rate. If a central bank wants to 
maintain the exchange rate at the desired level, it has to act in financial markets, consequently 
accumulating reserves.  
The possibility that, based on the strategic incentives of the accumulating countries, 
the process of accumulation could persist in the long run –as Dooley et al. defend for Asia–, 
and the implications for the global economy, raise the issue of the factors that may call a halt 
to the process, that is, whether the implied costs of accumulation may eventually outweigh 
the perceived benefits. 
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EXCHANGE RATE AND RESERVE ACCUMULATION (2004-2005) GRAPH 6
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
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3 The costs of reserves accumulation 
Much of the attention devoted to the costs of reserve accumulation focus on the fiscal costs 
of holding reserves (Hauner, 2005; Rodrik, 2006; Summers, 2006). However, the most 
immediate impact of reserve accumulation is on the monetary aggregates. It is convenient to 
make a digression to briefly explain how reserve accumulation can be managed by the central 
bank, through sterilization, and then assess the costs differentiating between costs arising 
when reserve accumulation is non-sterilized, and costs that arise when there is sterilization. 
The interest of this distinction rests on the fact that empirically we observe that at the 
beginning of the process of reserve accumulation, sterilization is more scarce and less 
important, but as the process goes on, and increases in reserves threatens domestic 
monetary policy, sterilization becomes more intensive until, eventually, the central bank is 
faced has to give priority either to domestic monetary policy or to exchange rate targeting. 
This implies that the type of costs arising vary at different stages of the process. 
3.1 A conceptual framework: Management of monetary policy under reserve 
accumulation 
Foreign exchange reserves accumulate as an asset of the Central Bank. In the balance sheet 
of the Central Bank (table I), the asset side is completed with the domestic credit of the 
central bank, which includes domestic credit to the banking system, and other assets. The 
liability side includes, roughly, bonds and monetary base (M), which comprises both currency 
in circulation and deposits (reserves) of the commercial banks, obtained mostly through 
reserve requirements. Net International reserves (NIR) are defined as foreign exchange 
reserves minus foreign liabilities, and Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the central bank are the 
sum of  credit to the banking system and  other domestic assets minus bonds1. 
Table I: Central Bank Balance Sheet  
Assets Liabilities 
Credit to the Banking System (NDA) Foreign Liabilities (-NIR) 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (NIR) Currency in circulation (M) 
Other domestic assets (NDA) Reserves of the banking system (M) 
 Bonds  (-NDA) 
 
Therefore, the following identity holds: 
 NIRNDAM +=  
                                                                          
1. We will use the terms net international reserves (NIR) and net foreign assets (NFA) alike. Given the way in which we 
have constructed the variable -see data appendix- they represent the same concept. Alternative constructions of NIR 
and NFA might lead to differences between the concepts -for instance, if liabilities with international financial institutions 
are included in NFA, but not in NIR. 
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and 
 NDAMNIR ∆−∆=∆  
With no further action of the Central Bank, reserve accumulation (an increase in NIR) implies 
an increase in the currency in circulation and thus on the liquidity of the economy. The liquidity 
so injected into the economy may lead to an expansion of credit and inflationary pressures 
and threaten the monetary policy targets of the Central Banks. 
Therefore, the Central Bank can decide to sterilize the reserve accumulation to 
prevent it from filtering into higher liquidity in the system. This is done either through a 
reduction in the net domestic assets, which can be carried out in different ways, or through 
an increase in the mandatory reserve deposits of banks (which increase the monetary base, 
without expanding the currency in circulation.) The net reduction in net domestic assets can 
be achieved in different ways. Sterilization can be done through market instruments, by 
issuing bonds –either central bank or government paper– (which implies an increase in the 
liabilities, more precisely) or the use of repos and swaps and the overnight deposit facility, and 
also through non-market instruments such as government deposits on the central bank or 
sales of reserves to the government (in order to reduce its external debt, for instance). In all 
these cases, increases in currency circulation are less than the increase in reserves (partial 
accumulation) or is nil (complete sterilization). 
INCREASES IN RESERVES AND STERILIZATION 2002-2006 GRAPH 7
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
(*) 2Q 2006 relative to 4Q 2005
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In the current process, sterilization is being implemented mainly through market 
instruments –open market operations– and to less extent through fiscal policy management 
(deposits of the government on the central bank, stabilization funds, and so on). However, 
historical evidence shows that when capital inflows are sustained for a prolonged period of 
time, it may become so cumbersome and costly to sterilize through open market operations 
that central bank can turn to sterilization through non-market instruments, such as reserve 
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requirements. In particular, non-market instruments were used intensively in the nineties (see 
Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999; Montiel and Reinhart, 2001), but in the recent episode, few 
countries have raised reserve requirements to sterilize, with the relevant exception of China 
(see the case study)2. 
The magnitude of sterilization can be assessed in the scatterplot in graph 7, where 
the increase in currency in circulation is plotted against the increase in reserves. Points below 
the 45º line (increases in reserves higher than increases in currency in circulation) evidence 
sterilization. Different colours are used for the years, being China the extreme right 
observation in every year. The parameter of a regression between both variables (pooling all 
the observations) is 0.37, implying that 63% percent of the increase in reserves is sterilized on 
average. The evidence presented in graph 7, that allows disentangling the evolution of 
sterilization over time, suggests that countries are sterilizing increasing proportions of the 
additional reserves, as since 2002 the sterilization curve becomes flatter every year. In 2006, 
as it turns out from the horizontal line, the accumulation of reserves did not translate into 
increases of the monetary base, on average, due to the large sterilization efforts by China. It is 
also noteworthy to see in graph 8 the evolution of sterilization and how countries reduced 
NDA as they accumulated NIRs, either from the beginning (negative slope) or after some time 
(the curve shifts from positive to negative). Examples of the first case are the Asian countries 
and of the second case is China: at the beginning it did not sterilize inflows, but it has started 
to sterilize them. By the moment, China seems able to sterilize the increases in reserves, as 
the pace of reserve accumulation does not seem to slowdown.  
The sterilization policy by the central bank is determined by several factors. First, the 
link between the increase in the monetary base and the expansion of credit and inflationary 
pressures is not equal in all countries, and depends very much on the different features of the 
domestic financial systems and of the growth of the economy. In economies where money 
holders tend to deposit their money in commercial banks, and where there is a well 
developed domestic banking system, able to channel domestic saving into an increase in 
credit, therefore causing inflationary pressures and asset bubbles, reserve accumulation can 
produce more problems with domestic monetary policy objectives than the problems that 
would be caused in an economy with a less developed domestic banking system. In 
compensation, the deeper the domestic financial market the larger the number of potential 
sterilization instruments. Second, if the economy is growing at a fast pace, the demand for 
money tends to be high, which implies that the increase in prices is lessened. Thus, in some 
cases monetary authorities do not face a trade-off between implementing an autonomous 
monetary policy and allowing the increase of capital inflows  
Given the preeminence of the exchange rate management motives in the current 
process of reserve accumulation, it is important to recall the proposition that in a framework 
of high capital mobility, it is not feasible to peg the exchange rate and manage domestic 
monetary policy autonomously…in the long run. Actually, sterilization is an attempt to bypass 
this basic proposition, at least for some time. As a matter of fact some central banks are 
being able, to some extent, to manage exchange rates and accumulate reserves without 
losing control of domestic monetary policy objectives, but this is an increasingly difficult 
challenge. Sooner or later the costs and limitation on monetary policy will come to the fore. 
                                                                          
2. An interesting issue is, therefore, whether sterilization is firstly implemented through market instruments, and when it 
becomes too costly, non-market instruments are used until, finally, central banks give up sterilization and their foreign 
exchange market intervention. 
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3.2 Perceived costs from accumulation and sterilization 
The main problem of non-sterilized intervention is that expansion of the monetary base can 
disrupt monetary policy management and feed into inflation. Central banks are expected to 
care about inflation, so before inflationary pressures deriving from non-sterilized intervention 
could arise, they turn to sterilize interventions. Therefore, sterilization may become a sign that 
domestic monetary policy objectives are jeopardised and therefore, usually the costs of non-
sterilized intervention remain latent through sterilization –which poses a challenge for a 
rigorous empirical approach. 
RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND STERILIZATION (4Q 1990 - 4Q 2005)                               GRAPH 8
USD bn
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
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Sterilization, in turn, generates a wide array of problems, whose nature depends on 
whether they sterilize through market or non-market instruments.  
When sterilization is done through market instruments3, there is an increase in 
the debt of the central bank, which is remunerated at a given interest rate –the one fixed 
                                                                          
3. In the following discussion we restrict to issuance of debt to drain liquidity. 
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in the auction of the debt. Part of these costs are reflected in prices, while others are 
disturbances on the financial system that are more difficult to identify. When there is an 
interest rate differential between the return on assets and the return on liabilities, there is 
an explicit cost, sometimes called quasifiscal cost of holding reserves. Table II provides the 
interest rates of intervention of the central banks that, compared with the returns on US 
Treasuries, are usually considered as proxies of these costs. Domestic interest rates differ 
substantially among countries, from the 15.5% interest rate in Brazil to the zero interest rate in 
Japan. This implies that while some countries enjoy benefits after sterilizing accumulated 
reserves, other countries suffer important losses.  
Sterilization through open market operations can lead to increases in interest rates if 
the supply of funds is high in relation to the demand for them. Both increases in debt and in 
interest rates generate potential risks of debt monetization. As Mohanty and Turner (2003) 
point out, unlike in other periods, during the current episode of foreign exchange market 
intervention, large scale issuance of sterilization bond has not pressed the interest rates up, 
as the domestic demand for these assets has been high. However, this does not imply that 
sterilization is absent of problems, Indeed, large scale sterilization coupled with high domestic 
demand by the banking system and pension funds can generate different problems even 
when the financial system seems to absorb the issuances without pressing the interest rates 
up. For instance, the large-scale issuance of sterilization bonds can create a crowding out on 
the private sector if there is a large appetite for these bonds given that as domestic bonds 
gain importance within the portfolio of financial intermediaries, they decrease other 
investment, and this way there might arise of problem of lack of credit, increases in interest 
rates for private loans, and so on (see the case of Argentina). Moreover, if the portfolio of the 
banking sector gets concentrated in government debt, there might be problems for domestic 
financial stability and conflicts between monetary policy and financial stability. In any case, all 
in all, these hidden costs differ substantially between countries. 
Even if it is difficult to provide general lessons, it can be concluded that large scale 
sterilization (through debt issuance) creates problems of crowding out and reduction in credit 
to the private sector, and problems of either increases in domestic interest rates, risks of 
monetization and increasing quasifiscal costs (if there is low demand for them), or domestic 
financial stability, if there is demand for these assets and gain importance in the portfolios of 
the domestic financial intermediaries, in particular the banking sector. 
The main costs of sterilization through reserve requirements are the distortions 
introduced in the commercial banking system. Reserve requirements act as a tax on the 
banking system, and contribute to a widening in the gap between loans and deposits interest 
rates4. Perhaps because of the distortions they introduce, central banks are avoiding to the 
extent of possible their use.  
Sterilization through fiscal policies, such as deposits of the government on the 
central bank, does not introduce direct distortions on the economy. However, it might lessen 
the independence of the central bank, and exposes the central bank to a sudden increase 
in the monetary base if the government changes its commitment and asks back the deposit. 
Sales of foreign reserves to the government that are paid with cash are a good way of 
sterilization, as drain liquidity in a permanent manner. However, it can pose problems such as 
                                                                          
4. See Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) for a discussion of the distortions caused by sterilization through reserve 
requirements. 
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the ones discussed before: possible reduction in central bank independence or dependence 
on the government to get involved in such an operation.  
Table II: Interest rates and reserve accumulation 
Country Interest rate 
(average 2003-2005) 
Accumulation of 
NFA (total 2003-
2005) –billions US $ 
Total NFA –
end 2005 
billions US $ 
Japan 0.12% 373 834 
China 1.95% 478 778 
Turkey 24% 20 13 
Brazil 19.5% 39.5 51 
Argentina 3.2% 22.7 18 
Korea 3.6% 86 203 
Singapore 1.3% 32 115 
Malaysia 2.72% 35 70 
Thailand 1.71% 16 52 
South Africa 8.23% 11 16 
Mexico 7.8% 20 68 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics). 
Looking forward, it is obvious that more sterilization has been done in past years, the 
more costly the process can be. This derives from the fact that distortions do accumulate, 
and that, when sterilization is done through issuance of government or central bank paper, it 
has to be sterilized once again when the debt matures. Moreover, large scale sterilization can 
be technically unfeasible in some countries, so sterilization costs can go together to growing 
expansion of liquidity and their consequences.  
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4 Case Studies 
While the costs of accumulation can be easily described, to put our hypothesis to test in a 
panel becomes even more contentious when we take into account the diverse determinants, 
drivers, environments in which different countries accumulate. This is clearly seen in the annex 
where three of the most relevant cases of reserve accumulation in the last years –China, 
Russia and Argentina– are described in detail.  
China is the largest holder of international reserves, having recently surpassed the 
trillion dollars of reserve holdings. Although the authorities state that the exchange rate floats, 
it is evident that keeping a controlled exchange rate is the overwhelming goal of the monetary 
policy, not only for competitiveness reasons but also to manage with more degrees of 
freedom the transition to a more open economy from a financial point of view. Russia 
epitomises accumulation related to the oil price and commodities boom and here the process 
is justified by the need to smooth out a shock which may be transitory. Argentina, finally, 
conveys both rationale; a positive terms of trade shock plus a strong wish to maintain a 
competitive exchange rate. 
To be sure, all three countries are facing increasing costs. Explicit inflationary 
pressures are only clearly evident in Argentina; authorities are facing increasing difficulties to 
manage the increase in reserves, also because monetary policy is not completely 
independent. In China, the large excess in liquidity has not transferred into headline inflation, 
due to the peculiarities of the financial system, but concerns of overheating of the economy 
and distortions in the financial system are increasing. In Russia, the problems have also a 
monetary dimension, but they are intertwined with fiscal concerns, since the sterilisation 
instruments are of fiscal nature and held in the central banks. Such big quantities of money 
are really tempting and they generate tensions between the central bank and the fiscal and 
political authorities. 
These different typologies do not hide a common fact. Despite the increasing 
difficulties the accumulation of reserves continues at a strong pace. All three countries have 
resorted to strategies to reduce the opportunity costs of reserves, like investment in 
alternative assets –like China or Russia– or helping to solve financial problems in other 
spheres of the economy –debt repayment in Argentina, bank recapitalisation in China. 
Moreover, in all of them the normal functioning of monetary policy and institutions is being 
jeopardised. China has resorted to controls and quantitative limits to credits, while Argentina 
has imposed tight price controls and disuassive actions to control inflationary pressures. In 
Russia, central bank autonomy is obviously threatened by potential clashes with politicians. 
All in all, there seem to persist leeways, actions or measures which allow the process 
of accumulation to go on. This, along the variety of experiences makes testing the question 
we posed a challenge, indeed. 
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5 Testing the limits of reserve accumulation 
After reviewing the potential costs of accumulation and the three cases above, it is 
remarkable that the literature has taken a very limited approach to assess the costs of reserve 
accumulation. To be fair, most past works trying to identify the determinants of reserve 
holdings did try to take into account the costs of holding reserves, but they just contemplated 
the quasifiscal costs (usually including interest rates differentials with the Treasury rates).  
Therefore, the main focus of this part is to asses the other costs, mostly in the monetary 
sphere since the actual costs of accumulating reserves arise predominantly from the 
monetary implications. 
We thus turn now to test whether current or prospective costs of the increase in 
reserves impinge on the process of accumulation. The testing strategy is not straightforward. 
We start by constructing a benchmark model for reserve accumulation. We proceed next to 
determine whether sterilization is the first measure to deal with the monetary effects of reserve 
accumulation. We turn finally to test whether the prospective monetary costs are a 
determinant of reserve accumulation.  
5.1 Benchmark model 
In order to construct a benchmark model, we choose as dependent variable the increases in 
reserves –∆NFA– and not the level of reserves, since we are interested in understanding the 
determinants of reserves accumulation and not of reserve adequacy, unlike most previous 
work. The basic benchmark equation is the following 
                   ∆NFAit =α + φ' yit +ηi + εit                 (1) 
where      is the set of explanatory variables and     are fixed effects. It should be first noted 
that estimating the model with fixed effect, together to the fact that the period of interest 
(1999-2005) is quite short, implies that variables such as, for instance, dummies for recent 
export-led growth policies, new precautionary motives after the financial crisis in the late 90s 
or scale variables (GDP) cannot be properly identified as are time invariant or display low 
variation over time. In the vector     , we first include the lagged level of NFA to control the 
time-variant trend in the growth of reserves. As proxies of precautionary motives we include 
two variables. First, a real exchange rate index, that allows to compute the importance of 
more or less aggressive export-led growth policies on reserve accumulation within each 
country. Second, a measure of the (in)flexibility of the nominal exchange rate, that roughly 
controls for possible interventions to avoid appreciation. Finally, the precautionary motives are 
captured including, as usual, imports and short term external debt. 
The results of the estimation of the model are displayed in Table III.  
 
 
 
 
ity iη
ity
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Table III: Determinants of reserve accumulation: equation 1 
             DETERMINANTS OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION
(Dependent variable is ∆ NFA)
[1] [2]
NFA(-1) 0.354*** 0.378***
0.000 0.000
RER -0.131** -0.126**
0.044 0.047
Short term external debt 0.762*** 0.841***
0.000 0.000
NER flexibility -0.063
0.727
Imports 0.083
0.151
Constant -4.449 -3.474
0.499 0.579
Observations 162 166
Number of country 29 29
R-squared 0.879 0.874
p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
As expected, after controlling for the scale variable, conveyed in the lagged level of reserves, 
countries with higher holdings of short term external debt accumulate more reserves –see 
column [1]. The effect of the real exchange rate is negative, something that implies that the 
more aggressive the export-led growth strategy (the lower real exchange rate) the higher 
reserve accumulation. Neither imports nor the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange 
rate are significant, albeit both display the expected sign. In column [2] the non-significant 
variables are dropped, and we will use this results as benchmark. 
5.2 Sterilization and determinants 
Before using this benchmark model we have to assess whether central banks engage in 
systematic sterilization when they face an undesirable expansion of liquidity. We consider that 
all central banks try to avoid the undesirable expansion of liquidity, and its effects, so we 
would expect sterilization to be more intense the greater the monetary problems. In graph 7 
we indeed saw that sterilisation rates were getting overall more intense. We start by 
identifying the determinants of sterilization through the estimation of equation (2):  
                   itiitit NFANDA εηβα ++∆+=∆                                       (2) 
This equation is related to the literature on sterilization, which attempts to identify the 
coefficient of sterilization, that is, the coefficient of ∆NFA in a regression of ∆NDA on ∆NFA 
and a set of controls. Here the rationale, and also the functional form, is different. 
We are interested in identifying the determinants of sterilization, and in obtaining a 
quantitative measure of their importance, so we include interactions of the vector x and 
∆NFA. Such vector includes lagged inflation and lagged ratio of increases in M2 to GDP. 
Inflation is included because the central bank is considered to be more reluctant to allow 
further expansions of the monetary base when the inflation is relatively high, and therefore 
sterilizes more on those cases. The ratio of ∆M2 to GDP is a potential explanation of reserve 
accumulation in two dimensions. First, it is a measure of latent risks of inflation, and central 
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banks with inflation targeting focus on it as a forward looking measure of inflation. Second, 
some central banks do not have inflation but money targets. For both reasons, central banks 
should be more reluctant to let the monetary base expand when the ratio of ∆M2 to GDP is 
high. In consequence, a high ratio should be associated with more sterilization. The reason 
why these variables are interacted with ∆NFA is that what makes compelling sterilization is the 
joint effect of potential monetary problems and high ∆NFA. 
A potential problem is to obtain consistent estimators of the vector β, because of the 
endogeneity of the variables of the vector x, that arise from the reverse causality –reserve 
accumulation, unless completely sterilized leads to inflation, credit and asset booms– and 
from the fact that the increase of reserves depends on the ability to sterilize (a shock on the 
ability to sterilize would probably affect the increase in reserves, so that).                                                      
. ( ) 0,cov ≠∆ ititNFA ε The exogeneity of the vector x has been preserved using lagged 
variables, so that  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∆=
−
−
1
1.
1
2,,1
it
it
itit GDP
Mx π  but, still, contemporaneous ∆NFA would 
remain endogenous. In order to overcome this problem, we use as instruments the lagged 
values of ∆NFA. All in all, if the coefficients of the vector β were negative, this would be 
evidence that sterilization depends on these factors in the expected way: for a given ∆NFA, 
the higher the inflation or ∆M2 to GDP, the more large-scale sterilization is.  
Table IV displays the results of the estimation of equation (3) by within groups 
estimation and taking into account endogeneity with the instrumental variable discussed. 
Column [2] and [3] show that both inflation and growth in money aggregates are significant 
explanatory variables of sterilization: for a given ∆NFA, sterilization is larger the higher are 
inflation and growth of money aggregates. 
Table IV: Results of sterilization determinants model –equation  (2) 
DETERMINANTS OF STERILIZATION
(Dependent variable is ∆NDA)
[1] [2] [3]
∆NFA -0.768*** 0.437*
0.000 0.080
∆NFA*π(-1) -0.190*** -0.133***
0.000 0.000
∆NFA*∆M2(-1)/GDP(-1) -1.386*** -0.910***
0.000 0.000
Constant 2.027*** 1.316 2.147***
0.000 0.134 0.004
Observations 166 137 137
Number of country 29 29 29
R-squared 0.8044 0.7748 0.8166 
p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
5.3 Assessing the limits 
From these results it follows that, as conventional wisdom suggests, all central banks care 
about the monetary effects of reserve accumulation, and their first measure in order to 
maintain monetary policy independence is sterilization. The remaining question is whether 
costs of accumulating reserves are relevant explanatory variables. As explained in section 3 
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the costs are of two principal types –fiscal and monetary. Other costs– to the financial 
system, conflicts among authorities, etc, are even more difficult to measure empirically. 
We include a measure for quasifiscal returns, based in the difference between the 
return on reserves and the domestic cost of opportunity. If these returns are positive, reserves 
yield a benefit, otherwise they imply a cost (see data appendix). Given this definition we would 
expect our measure of quasifiscal benefits/costs to display a positive sign –net fiscal benefits 
would be positively related to reserve accumulation, net costs would be negatively related to 
it. Less obvious is how to proxy the prospective monetary costs. We do not include directly 
any measure of (undesired) expansion of liquidity as possible deterrent of the process, 
because such measures are plagued with reverse causation problems. Inflation is not 
included either in this last equation, as their effects are taken into account through the real 
exchange rate. However, we have shown that the sterilization efforts are related to potential 
excess liquidity and inflationary pressures, conveyed in the interaction with the reserve 
accumulation, as shown in table IV. 
This means that monetary costs may be reflected in the sterilisation effort rather than 
in the accumulation process itself. Therefore, the previous analysis on sterilisation sets the 
basis for the variables conveying monetary costs. More precisely, we consider, on the one 
hand, the stock of net domestic assets as a proxy of ability to sterilize, as all sterilization is 
reflected in the central bank balance sheet as a reduction in NDA, no matter whether 
sterilization is done through government deposits, reduction in loans to the banking system or 
–as usual– open market operations.5 Thus, central banks with higher NDA are expected to 
be more able to accumulate more reserves, meaning a expected positive sign. We include 
this variable lagged, as what we expect to explain reserve accumulation at time t is NDA in 
the previous period, known at t-1.  
On the other hand, we include a rather general proxy of the need to sterilise by 
including the moving averages of effective sterilisation, both in absolute and relative levels. In 
particular, we consider two variables: 
• Absolute Moving Average of sterilization (AMA_need), with a two-year window: 
( )1 2
2
it it
it
NDA NDA
AMA − −
∆ + ∆= , which is a measure of sterilization in the previous 
two periods.  
• Relative Moving Average of sterilisation (RMA_need): 
21
21
−−
−−
∆+∆
∆+∆=
itit
itit
it NFANFA
NDANDARMA  , which takes into account the total reserve 
accumulation.  
In both cases a negative value of the variables indicates sterilization. We conjecture 
that a negative coefficient for these variables in the regression indicates that central banks 
                                                                          
5. For those central banks that sterilize with open market operations and cannot issue their own notes to sterilize, NDA 
can be taken as a quite adequate measure of ability to sterilize. Less tight is the link between NDA and ability to sterilize 
in those countries where the central bank implements open market operations issuing its own debt, or thanks to 
government deposits. 
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implement sterilisation and this allows for continued accumulation of reserves. On the 
contrary, if the sign were positive this would evidence that previous sterilisation is limiting 
current accumulation, yielding complementary evidence to limits of the ability to sterilize. In 
other words, if the sign revealed in the regression is negative we infer that the sterilisation 
needs are there but they  not impinge on the process of accumulation so far.   
The extended model is the following:  
ititititititit needRMAneedAMANDAqfXNFA υλλλγβα ++++++=∆ − __' 3211 (3) 
The results of the extended model are displayed in table V. Quasifiscal returns are 
significant when they are included in the basic model (column [1]), and display the expected 
sign, albeit  become non-significant in the fully extended model, where we include the three 
proxies of prospective monetary-sterilization costs. As expected, the higher are the (lagged) 
NDA –the higher the ability to sterilize– the more reserves are accumulated. AMA and RMA 
are both significant and display a negative sign:  the higher is sterilization in absolute terms, 
and relative to the growth in reserves, the more intense is reserve accumulation. This 
suggests that, so far, sterilisation provides extended scope for further accumulation, rather 
than limiting it. To sum up, the empirical evidence points to the notion that that monetary 
effects matter insofar as the ability to sterilize –as measured by NDA– is jeopardised, but that 
they are not effectively binding, since countries go on accumulating reserves by increasing 
sterilisation. 
Table V: Results of the estimation of the extended model –equation 3 
DETERMINANTS OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION
(Dependent variable is DNFA)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
NFA(-1) 0.383*** 0.525*** 0.471*** 0.433*** 0.438***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RER -0.123* -0.112* -0.173*** -0.115** -0.112**
0.054 0.059 0.005 0.044 0.046
Short term external debt 0.851*** 0.663*** 0.785*** 0.688*** 0.672***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Quasifiscal results 0.145** 0.074 0.089 0.054
0.045 0.284 0.187 0.382
NDA(-1) 0.269*** 0.202*** 0.392*** 0.408***
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
RMA_need -0.023*** -0.016** -0.016**
0.004 0.023 0.025
AMA_need -0.323*** -0.328***
0.000 0.000
Constant -4.714 -7.855 -1.793 -6.190 -6.054
0.456 0.187 0.770 0.273 0.275
Observations 162 162 162 162 166
Number of country 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.878 0.895 0.902 0.919 0.918
p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have assessed, in two different ways, whether domestic costs are imposing 
a limit on reserve accumulation. Fiscal or quasi-fiscal costs, which have been the main focus 
of the literature do not seem to be of overwhelming concern in most cases, due to the 
environment of low global interest rates. More important seem to be the challenges within the 
monetary sphere. There, rather conventional problems are being faced, such as inflationary 
pressures and credit booms; difficulties to carry out proper sterilization are also issues in 
countries with less developed financial system. Other less known nuisances are arising, such 
as the potential conflict of interest with fiscal authorities (when the sterilization instruments are 
government paper or when the central bank paper compete with government bonds) or/and 
a greater dependence on governments  –and thus need to coordinate– to sterilize inflows. 
The impact of sterilization on domestic financial stability and restructuring is also an important 
concern in countries with underdeveloped financial system. The case studies have highlighted 
the wide array of challenges reserve accumulation imposes on domestic monetary policy, 
and the different solutions that are being taken.  
Indeed, countries seem to keep accumulating reserves with no respite, and the 
empirical approach taken in this paper suggests that the perceived cost have not in general 
impinged on the process of reserve accumulation. On the one hand, fiscal costs are not 
relevant in the panel. To this may have contributed, in practice, the more active reserve 
management carried out in recent times by central banks, in search of higher profitability 
and/or diversification of reserve holdings. On the other hand, the analysis of monetary costs 
faces some important challenges which have been addressed throughout the empirical part. 
We have shown that indeed, excess liquidity and inflationary pressures determine the degree 
of sterilisation –that is perceived monetary costs, call for a reaction of the authorities. 
Therefore, accumulation is not inocuous in terms of costs, but we have also shown that the 
policy reaction has not entailed an obstacle for the accumulation process; rather the central 
banks through increased sterlisation are able to manage the situation –at least in the short to 
medium run– since we have not found that higher sterilisation is associated to limits to reserve 
accumulation. 
Thus, at this stage, central banks are able to contain the monetary costs of reserve 
accumulation through sterilization and without resorting to a change of policy. This does not 
mean that the concern about the consequences –and, therefore, the degree of sterilization, 
has increased over time. The reason is probably that the final goal of reserve accumulation–
increasingly identified with exchange rate management– is of overwhelming importance, so 
that, before changing this overriding goal a wide battery of policy measures –sterilisation, 
alternative investments and, eventually in some countries, capital controls, credit ceilings, 
price controls are being instrumented to limit the arising costs and to maintain the process. 
Looking forward, the perceived scope to manage increases in reserves, does not point at 
drastic changes in policies, but, if anything to a very gradual shift. 
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ANNEX. THREE CASE STUDIES: CHINA, RUSSIA, ARGENTINA 
In this annex three cases are described. Each focuses on how the central bank has managed 
to deal with the associated potential problems, and with the domestic consequences of 
reserve accumulation. 
A. CHINA: Exchange Rate Undervaluation and Overheating 
Description 
In 2001, just before its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s 
international assets represented 169 billions. In contrast, China has currently become the top 
holder of international reserves and it has by 2006 surpassed the trillion dollars of reserve 
holdings nearly six times higher than in 2001, and one fifth of the world total. After growing 
smoothly from 1998, the pace of the reserve accumulation process fostered in 2001 when 
the negotiations with the WTO were near to end and, and since when the effective real 
exchange rate began to depreciate. The acceleration of reserve holding reached a peak in 
November 2003, when the first signals of economic overheating arose. Between 2004 and 
2006, the holdings increased by 550 billions US $ (graph  A.1, panel 1) and the pace of the 
accumulation remained very high within a range of 30-50%, boosted mainly by trade flows 
due to the discretional capital controls (graph A.1, panel 2). 
Drivers 
Because of the size of the reserve holdings and the persistence of accumulation, it is widely 
recognized this phenomena is closely related to China’s exchange rate policy and the well-
known and increasing renminbi undervaluation in real effective terms6. Over the last decade, 
the exchange rate of the renminbi, although theoretically flexible, has been closely tied to the 
dollar. As a result, the Chinese currency underwent significant depreciations in real effective 
terms during the period from end-2001 to 2004. In 2005, the Chinese authorities took 
successive steps to reform the exchange rate regime, which highlights the renminbi 
revaluation against the dollar by 2.1% and the formal pegged to a basket of currencies. These 
reforms had the effect of reversing the renminbi’s depreciation and, between December 2004 
and August 2006, the currency appreciated 3.8% against the dollar and 7% in real effective 
terms over this period and the pace of reserve accumulation slowed from 52% to 30% year-
over-year. From a broader perspective, however, in real effective terms the renminbi still 
depreciated by 3.7% compared with 2001.  
Consequences and policy response 
In the past three years, the export led strategy and the consequent reserve accumulation has 
caused a substantial and growing liquidity in the economy (graph A.1, panel 3). In 2004, the 
loose monetary conditions fed overinvestment in certain sectors, a residential price bubble in 
high growth cities and a substantial rise in inflation, fuelling a more generalized overheating of 
the economy like the one in the early 1990s. The associated rapid growth in bank credit also 
raised the spectre of substantial wave of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the mid-term, adding 
to the large stock of existing NPLs. When the problem was identified, the Central Government 
                                                                          
6. A number of indications lend weight to this view, namely the substantial dynamism of the Chinese economy, export 
growth, its growing trade surplus, the increase in its share of international markets and its massive accumulation of 
foreign reserves. 
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settled a series of administrative controls to contain investment. The People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), the central bank, increased interest rates, reserve requirement and began to sterilize 
the rise in net foreign assets (graph A.1, panels 1 and 3). Nonetheless, these efforts to cool 
the economy through administrative controls on lending and property investment reached 
limited success: the series of tightening measures slowed the pace of investment growth, 
although it remained high and substantial liquidity persisted in the banking system. In 2005, 
the central bank continued with the sterilization operations in the inter-bank market through 
open market operations (OMOs) and the issuance of central bank bills (C-bills) in a regular 
basis (graph A.1, panel 4). In the second quarter of 2006, new signs of overheating arose: 
investment, credit and monetary aggregates grew at very fast pace. Monetary policy 
responded with a further tightening in order to avoid that a continued rise in credit growth 
would fuel a further increase in investment growth and affect financial stability in the medium 
term. Thus, on one hand, it increased the reference rate on loans twice in 54 basic points and 
on deposits in 27bp. On the other hand, it intensified OMOs by accelerating the issuance of 
C-bills and raising the reserve requirement in order to sterilize the raise in reserves, which 
leaded an increase the interest rate in the inter-bank market in 110 basic points in the last 
year. 
Perceived problems 
In addition to other pernicious effects of the China’s exchange rate export-led policy, the 
accumulation of reserves inherent in this strategy has important domestic consequences. 
First, instead of contributing to fostering investment or, especially, consumption, or to the 
repayment of external debt, it is channelling a portion of domestic savings abroad. Second, 
as previously seen, the growth in foreign assets also is creating problems for the operation of 
monetary policy, as the assets have to be sterilised, at least partially, to prevent excess 
liquidity and credit expansion will boost investment generating overcapacity, feed inflation of 
consumer prices or asset price bubbles and, in the medium term, exacerbate the problem of 
NPLs. Third, sterilization’s operations have increased interest rates in the inter-bank market, 
which could be translated to public debt market –introducing fiscal costs– or, even, to the 
rest of securities –crowding-out investment–. Moreover, sterilization operations could lower 
even more the commercial bank’s profitability. In fact, commercial banks’ balance sheet 
structure have changed recently, in 2005 loans represented 52% of the assets, 8 points less 
than in 2001, reflecting the increase of their acquisition of sterilization instruments7. Then, the 
efforts to set up a commercially driven, profitable, efficient and solvent banking system could 
be jeopardized. Moreover, the economic authorities’ attempts to restrain indirectly bank 
lending also contradicts the government’s goal of creating a sound banking sector. Fourth, 
other reserve accumulation costs that affect a central bank’s balance sheet, such as foreign 
exchange risk or interest rate risk, should not be forgotten either because of they can affect 
the conduction of monetary an exchange rate policy.  
Nonetheless, the Chinese economy shows some peculiarities that alleviated some of 
the adverse domestic consequences, or even helped to mitigate some mounting problems. 
This was the case with the usage, between 2003 and 2005, of part of reserves has been to 
strengthen the capital base of the banking system through the injection of 60 billion US $ into 
the three of the four major state commercial banks8 that, by the moment, cannot be 
                                                                          
7. There is a substantial gap between the reference rate on loans (1 year: 6.11%) and the current C-bills return (around 
2.2%), that obviously could affect the overall profitability of commercial banks. 
8. Thus, in December 2003, two capital injections of 22.5 billion US $ each were to the China Construction Bank and 
Bank of China and, in April 2005, 15 billion US $ to the Industrial Commercial Bank. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0706 
converted into RMB. Additionally, this increased the scope for further accumulation. 
Furthermore, the discretional use of controls on capital inflows and outflows in order to 
diminish the accumulation of reserves and provide some room for manoeuvre for monetary 
policy, such as the recently introduced Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme 
which softens capital outflows, although the effectiveness of capital controls inevitably erodes 
over time as domestic and international investors find channels to evade them. The 
underdeveloped financial markets has allowed the interest rates increases in the inter-bank 
not to move to other securities alleviating fiscal costs or crowding-out investment; also, the 
high degree of intervention of the public authorities in the economy through moral suasion 
and administrative controls has constrained credit, investment and prices in certain sectors. 
Nonetheless, this reliance in non-standard instruments will have to diminish as the increasing 
sophistication of the economy reduces their effectiveness and raises the cost of the 
distortions that they create.  
On the other hand, China’s foreign assets accumulation has also had global 
repercussions. The accumulation of reserves, mostly in the form of dollar-denominated 
assets, could have contributed to the reduction in the US long term interest rates and to 
finance the growing US current account and fiscal deficit. A sudden change in China’s policy 
of accumulating reserves –which already account for roughly one-fifth of the world total– 
could well have an impact on global financial stability. 
Assessment 
The current process of reserve accumulation is not sustainable forever as its costs will 
overcome the benefits. To date, China has incentives to maintain artificially an undervalued 
renminbi to promote the export sector and, then, smooth some domestic imbalances, such 
as regional and wealth inequalities, and the job losses resulting from the restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the weakness of the financial system will impede a 
greater flexibility of capital controls discouraged a greater flexibility of the exchange rate. 
Therefore, in the mid term, it is likely that the current undervaluation of the renminbi will be 
maintained to some extent and, consequently, the international assets accumulation. 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned internal and external costs of this will probably increase, 
feeding the already growing pressures of the international community to China so as to make 
him play a bigger role in the reduction of the global imbalances through a higher renminbi’s 
flexibility. Therefore, it is likely greater exchange rate flexibility and a reduction of the reserve 
accumulation process, which would benefit not only to China but also the rest of the world. 
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CHINA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND MONETARY EFFECTS                GRAPH A.1 
SOURCE: People's Bank of China. SOURCE: People's Bank of China.
(a) Includes net inflows in portfolio investment, other investment and error and 
omissions.
SOURCE: People's Bank of China. SOURCE: People's Bank of China.
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B. RUSSIA: Dealing with the Mixed Blessed of Oil prices 
Description of the process 
Russia’s international reserves were 27.9 billions of US $ in 2000 (9.5% GDP). Since then, 
they have risen at a fast pace, reaching 265 billions of US $ in August 2006 (23% GDP). 
Together to this increase in international reserves, Russia’s wealth has expanded through the 
constitution and growth of an oil stabilization fund. The fund, kept in rubles at an account at 
the Central Bank, was established in 2004 and it has grown steadily reaching the equivalent 
of more than 66 billion US $ in August 2006. During the second quarter of 2006, nearly 20 
billion US $ of the stabilization fund have been converted into foreign currency and kept in a 
Federal Treasury Account in the Central Bank9.  
Drivers 
The key factor in the growth of the foreign assets of the central bank has been the increase in 
oil prices. The price of oil was over 30 US $/bbl at the beginning of 2000, and has risen 
steadily since then reaching 70 US $/bbl, in the second quarter of 2006. This oil boom has 
generated a wide trade and current account surplus, and it has flooded the economy with 
foreign currency, putting upward pressure on the exchange rate. Given the commitment of 
the Central Bank towards maintaining a managed floating exchange rate with the US $, the 
                                                                          
9. Although we are not sure about whether the foreign currency has been purchased from the central bank’s 
international reserves or from the foreign exchange market, the idea was to implement this measure through purchases 
of international reserves, and we tend to think this has been the case. The following discussion builds on that 
assumption. 
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Central Bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market acquiring US $ in order to avoid 
the appreciation of the ruble, this way accumulating reserves10.  
The parallel build-up of the stabilization fund is also closely linked to oil prices. 
Although oil companies are private, the state has established different taxes on oil, among 
which it is worth mentioning the tax on the extraction of oil, and a progressive tax on oil 
revenues when the price exceeds a given threshold –established on 27 $US barrel. These 
fiscal revenues have been huge and a fraction of them are placed in the Stabilization Fund in 
order to smooth the government revenues. The taxes on oil revenues are paid in rubles so the 
resources of the Stabilization Fund are also held in domestic currency. To sum up, the 
upward trend in oil prices has contributed to the accumulation of international reserves by the 
central bank and to the constitution of a Stabilization Fund, increasing the wealth of Russia’s 
public sector and reducing (if not eliminating) its vulnerability towards sudden stops of 
capitals.  
Monetary effects of the process 
The impact of higher reserves on the monetary base has been limited. Sterilization of the 
increases in liquidity through market instruments would be difficult in Russia, as local bond 
markets are not well developed and neither central bank paper, nor government debt can be 
used in large scale sterilization. Interestingly, the Stabilization Fund has become the central 
sterilizing device. It is a central bank liability in domestic currency and its parallel growth with 
reserves implies that it actually sterilises the growth in reserves, limiting the expansion of the 
monetary base. The volume of the Stabilization Fund at June 2006 was 1,800 billion rubles, a 
substantial magnitude relative to the monetary base, as panel 2 of graph shows. The strong 
economic growth associated to the favourable oil cycle allows to absorb the additional 
liquidity of the system, and so far although inflation remains high for current international 
standard (13% in 2005), it has been kept under control. 
Perceived problems 
The ad hoc nature of the stabilization fund and the limited potential for alternative massive 
sterilization is a potential problem. The large quantities of money kept idle in the Stabilization 
Funds have raised political pressures to use them for other purposes, either to spend or to 
invest. The monetary consequences of the mobilization of the resources of the fund would 
differ depending on the kind of use attached to the resources. Given the scale of the fund 
spending these resources in consumption would fuel inflationary pressures, both through its 
impact on demand, and through the flooding of liquidity into the economy. If, on the contrary, 
the resources of the Fund were invested, their impact would differ depending on whether they 
were invested within Russia or outside Russia. If the resources are invested domestically 
–either in physical capital or assets– there will be an increase in the money in circulation, and 
at the same time the investment may contribute to the generation of financial bubbles. Given 
the shallowness of the domestic financial system, it may also entail risks for financial stability. 
On the contrary, if the fund is invested in foreign assets –in search for profitability– and the 
foreign assets are purchased from the central bank –that is, if the government buys 
international reserves with the resources of the fund– the operation does not change the 
consolidated public sector debt, nor does have impact on inflation or the domestic financial 
                                                                          
10. The central bank is also intervening on the euro/ruble exchange rate. 
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markets. As a matter of fact, it would imply a reduction in the central bank balance sheet, 
letting more leeway for further interventions.  
The recent investment of resources from the stabilization funds in foreign investment 
has followed these lines, therefore overcoming the inflationary effects of the expenditure of the 
funds within the domestic economy. However, the political pressures entailing this situation 
and the discretion of the ‘de facto’ government in the management of the fund, implies a 
potential risk for the joint achievement of monetary policy and exchange rate goals. Given the 
paramount importance given to the exchange rate level –in order to avoid competitiveness 
losses in non-energy (oil and gas) sectors (Dutch disease effects), it is unlikely that the Central 
Bank let the exchange rate appreciate. The loss or downsizing of the stabilization fund as 
sterilization device has thus the potential to generate a severe inflationary problem. 
Assessment 
The Russian case highlights the monetary management problems arising from an oil boom in 
a large exporter. The underdevelopment of the financial system difficults traditional sterilization 
devices, but an unorthodox instrument, also derived from the oil booms, helps to mitigate the 
problem. Since the management of this Fund is in the hands of the government, there is a 
clear subordination of the monetary policy management to the fiscal authority decision, 
putting the central bank in a weak position to achieve autonomously its monetary policy 
objectives. 
RUSSIA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND MONETARY EFFECTS              GRAPH A.2 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics) and
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics), Central 
Bank and Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
SOURCE: Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
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C. ARGENTINA: reserve accumulation and inflationary pressures 
Description of the process 
During the severe crisis of 2001-2002, –which implied a sovereign default, the compulsory 
dedollarization of the economy, a deep banking crisis and an extreme economic depression–  
the international reserves of Argentina dropped to 10 billion US $, and the exchange rate 
experienced a substantial depreciation. Soon after, Argentina started to accumulate reserves 
at a rapid pace, so they reached the pre-crisis levels during the first half of 2005, and arrived 
to more than 28 billion dollars at the end of that year. As panel 1 in graph A.3 shows, 
international reserves dropped to 18 billion US $ in January after Argentina used 9.5 billion of 
US $ to repay the outstanding debt with the IMF, but by the end of the summer they already 
surpassed the holdings of the end of 2005. 
Drivers 
The accumulation of foreign reserves by Argentina can be attributed to two reasons: the 
objective of maintaining the exchange rate at a competitive level, i.e., by offsetting the strong 
appreciation pressures on the peso, and the replenishment of reserve holdings after the crisis 
in order to the reduce financial vulnerability.   
It is not easy to disentangle the importance of each reason on the interventions of the central 
bank. At the beginning of the process, the low level of the international reserves called for a 
rebuilding of the stock of reserves. The reduction of vulnerability has been achieved not only 
directly (by building up a buffer against sudden stops of capitals), but also indirectly, through 
their use to pay back external debt. The biggest of the operation took place in January of 
2006, when the central bank repaid the 9.5 billion outstanding debt with the IMF. As a matter 
of fact, the IMF loan was deposited as reserves in the Central Bank and as a counterpart the 
liability side of the CB was increased by the same amount but, without a comfort level of 
autonomous reserves, Argentina would not have been able to implement this measure. The 
impact of the repayment can be seen in graph A.3. It implied a fall in reserves (panel 1) a 
strong reversal in the financial account (panel 2), but no impact on the net foreign assets 
(panel 3). Furthermore, the cost of the loan was higher than other internal credit to the 
government, so there was not only a reduction in external debt but also of the debt burden11.  
Notwithstanding the importance of these precautionary motives, it soon became evident that 
they could not explain by itself the size of the dollar purchases, and that there was a tacit 
policy objective of targeting the exchange rate at around 3 ARS/US $. By maintaining the 
nominal exchange rate undervalued with respect to the market exchange rate (and as long as 
inflation is relatively contained), the real exchange rate remains competitive with respect to its 
main trade partners. Thus, the exchange rate policy is supporting a remarkable and persistent 
current account surplus that, together to the financial account surplus, matches statistically 
the increase in reserves, as panel 2 of graph A.3 shows. The exchange rate policy is also 
having important fiscal effects. The trade-related tax revenues are collected in ARS pesos, 
so the combination of an undervalued exchange rate and high export revenues leads to 
important fiscal revenues. In fact, although these taxes are causing important distortions on 
                                                                          
11. However, this use of reserves is not free of problems. The pay back deprives the authorities in Argentina from a 
discipline anchor (indeed, the desire to feel free of the IMF’s surveillance is often considered the underlying motive of the 
operation). Moreover, the central bank dependence of the government has increased through the decree enacted to 
allow the operation. All together, the operation provides more room for interventions in support of the exchange rate. 
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the economy, their contribution to total revenues is substantial, as they accounted in 2005 to 
10.1% of the total public sector revenues (2.3% of GDP), representing a 88.5% of the primary 
balance.   
Monetary effects 
The large purchases of dollars to maintain the nominal exchange rate are generating 
increasing difficulties in the management of domestic monetary policy. Panel 3 of graph A.3 
shows how the increases in reserves are the main source of creation of monetary base, and, 
even if at the beginning of the process only a small fraction of increases of reserves were 
sterilized, the importance attached to preventing monetary base expansions –sterilization– 
has increased substantially since 2004. However, the monetary conditions, as the negative 
real interest rates show, are quite loose in spite of the inflationary pressures.  
The central bank is partially offsetting the expansion of liquidity through different instruments, 
of which the issuance of central bank bonds (LEBAC and NOBAC) has been the main one (as 
shown in panel 4 of graph A.3). The situation of financial rebuilding of Argentina makes 
difficult an assessment of the impact of this large-scale issuance of this paper on interest 
rates, since very different developments converge nowadays (for example, change of 
instruments, banking sector refurbishing, large liquidity, etc). However, it seems that there is 
no such upward pressure on interest rates, given that the banking sector is showing an 
important appetite for these assets. Rather than helpful, this may be a further obstacle for the 
management of monetary policy, since the transmission mechanism is being quite disturbed 
and the monetary authorities, even when they may control liquidity, have no clear levers to 
influence directly on the interest rates. An often neglected problem of sterilization through 
bonds, which could be relevant in Argentina, is that the sterilization is only temporary. In other 
words, when the maturity of the sterilization bonds arrives, new bonds have to be issued to 
avoid the expansion of liquidity arising from the face value of the bonds and their interests. 
Therefore, sterilization through bonds entails a potential rollover problem that could eventually 
lead to an expansion of liquidity12.  
The second instrument used to drain liquidity has been the repayment of the loans 
(rediscount lines) given to the commercial banking system during the 2001-2002 crises, 
which are also displayed in graph A.3, panel 4. Through these repayments 13 billion pesos 
have been sterilized, and at the same time commercial banks balance sheets have been 
tidied up.  
Moreover, in the last few months, there has been an increase in government 
deposits on the central bank, that, although could be withdrawn from the central bank, 
temporary offset the expansion of the monetary base. However, it cannot be argued that the 
government is purposefully sterilizing through this mechanism (as it happens in Russia with 
the stabilization fund). 
 
                                                                          
12. However, this use of reserves is not free of problems. The pay back has been considered dangerous as once the 
requirements of the IMF are no longer in force it provides more room of manoeuvre for the government (indeed, the 
desire to feel free of the IMF’s surveillance is often considered the underlying motive of the operation). Moreover, the 
central bank dependence of the government has increased through the decree enacted to allow the operation. All 
together, the operation provides more room for interventions in support of the exchange rate, a policy which is, as we 
discuss later, plenty of problems. 
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Perceived problems 
Together to the problems arising from sterilization (discussed in the previous point), the 
process is creating a wide range of problems. The most evident is the fact that expansion of 
liquidity arising from the partial sterilization is feeding into inflationary pressures. Given the 
limitations of monetary policy both in priorities –the exchange rate controls seem to be the 
paramount objective–, and instruments –the transmission mechanism is much distorted and 
the ability to control inflationary pressures of the central bank jeopardised–, alternative tools 
have been in place to control the inflationary pressures. These tools consist of compulsory 
price controls, moral suasion and regulated prices not responding to the increase of shocks. 
Indeed, these unorthodox measures have temporarily stabilised inflation around 10%, a high 
level that, however, seems within the tolerable range. However, inflationary pressures remain 
latent and price controls are distorting the price assignment mechanism in different ways, this 
way causing substantial inefficiencies in the economy. 
Looking ahead, however, the margin of manoeuvre to go on sterilizing is being 
reduced. The fact that the central bank cannot rely on the remaining 8.9 billion loans to the 
commercial banking system to sterilize, so this sterilization instrument seems a bit exhausted 
as the debtor banks do not seem to have the financial soundness to repay in advance. 
Furthermore, there is a limit on the amount that banks can accommodate central bank paper. 
Probably, this limit has been widened with the law which limit government paper to the banks 
to 40% of their assets, but in any case, the magnitudes which they already hold are huge, 
and the rollover problem applies. Therefore, as it has happened during the first quarter of 
2006 (see graph A.3, panel 4), future sterilization will have to be done through open market 
operations, so it will probably become more difficult and costly.  
A cause of greater concern is how the interaction between central banks and 
government objectives affect the former’s autonomy. Monetary policy is not only 
subordinated to the exchange rate, but the sterilization needs may eventually put pressure on 
the interest rates on the whole range of instruments, including government bonds. This is a 
potential source of conflicts between both institutions. 
Finally, although it is fair to mention that, with all its drawbacks, ample liquidity 
conditions have allowed a gradual recomposition of the banks balance sheets and a recovery 
of their activity with reduced costs, the distortions on the balance sheets of banks may 
generate financial stability problems in the medium term. 
Assessment 
To sum up, domestic monetary policy in Argentina is subordinated to the exchange rate 
target implicitly determined by the government. The main operational goal of the central bank 
now is to manage the process of reserve accumulation through sterilization to avoid feeding 
further into inflationary pressures. Control of inflation is being carried out mostly through 
administrative measures which reinforce the interventionist drive of the economy in other 
sector. Given the strong reliance of fiscal revenues and continued growth on a competitive 
exchange rate, a voluntary change of strategy –allowing a more appreciated exchange rate 
and a halt in the accumulation process– is not envisaged in the short run. Rather, if the 
inflationary pressures continue and the current monetary strategy is pushed to its limits, an 
strengthening of the administrative controls and a further drift towards interventionist policies 
is granted in the medium run.  
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ARGENTINA: RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES        GRAPH A.3 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Argentina. SOURCE: Ministry of Economy and Production of Argentina.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (IFS) and Central Bank of Argentina. SOURCE: Central Bank of Argentina.
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DATA APPENDIX 
a. Sample 
Our sample contains yearly observations for 29 emerging economies13 during the period 
1999-2005. We drop from the sample several observations in which there was a sudden 
reduction in NFA, so that we have, at the end, 166 observations.  
b. Variables  
- Net foreign assets (NFA) and Net international reserves (NIR): foreign assets minus 
foreign liabilities, from the central bank balance sheet obtained from IFS-IMF. 
- Net Domestic Assets (NDA): Data on NDA is obtained using the identity M=NDA+NFA 
and the data on monetary base from the central bank balance sheet, from IFS-IMF. 
- GDP: When possible, real GDP has been obtained from IFS (line 99b). In some countries 
the information has been obtained from other sources. These are: 
o Brazil, Chipre, India and Venezuela: Datastream 
o China: constructed from the Asia Regional Information Center. 
o Rusia: measured in domestic currency. Obtained from Datastream for the 
period 2003Q1 a 2005Q4, and own estimation for 1999Q1 y 2002Q4. 
 
- Nominal interest rates: When possible, we have used the overnight interest rate (IFS, 
line 60b). The exceptions are the following: China, one week repo (CEIC); Egypt, Hungary 
and Israel, Treasury interest rate; India and Peru: Datastream. 
- Inflation: CPI y-o-y inflation, obtained from IFS (line 64). In China, we have used CPI 
inflation obtained from CEIC for the period 2001Q1-2005Q4, and our estimation based 
on the reconstruction of the index for the period 987Q1-2001Q4, using the CEIC data 
and the rates of interannual variation of IFS.  
- Nominal exchange rate: Quarterly nominal exchange rate measured in US $, obtained 
from IFS (line AH).  
- M2: IFS.  
- Imports: IFS 
- Short term external debt: Institute of International Finance database, code D203.  
- NER flexibility: coefficient of variation of the nominal exchange rate (standard deviation 
of the nominal exchange rate standardized by the average nominal exchange rate), with 
monthly data.  
- Quasifiscal results: using the nominal interest rates and NDA, NFA described 
above, quasifiscal results are defined as 
         1 1 1 1
1 1
* *it it it it
it
it it
irate NDA ieeuu NFAQF
NDA NFA
− − − −
− −
+= +  
- RER index: weighted RER using bilateral nominal exchange rates and trade flows, and 
inflation, obtained from JP Morgan database. 
                                                                          
13. These are: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela. 
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